In the governance of human affairs, there is always a natural tension, and balance to be struck, between centralization and devolution.

In California, the state government started giving up responsibility for passenger rail in the 1990s and devolved it to the counties acting through joint powers agencies (JPAs). It is the writer’s contention that this devolution of authority has in many respects been a failure, and it is past time to review the existing governance structures.

There are many large organizations, both public and private, responsible for planning and executing rail transportation in California. The number of organizations involved, “too many cooks syndrome” is a critical problem resulting in project delays.

For example, there are 11 mainline rail right-of-way owners in Southern California:

• The Class I railroads (UP and BNSF)
• Metrolink member agencies (LA Metro, Orange County Transportation Authority, San Bernardino County Transportation Authority, Riverside County Transportation Commission, Ventura County Transportation Commission)
• North County Transit District and the Metropolitan Transportation System in San Diego County
• The cities of Los Angeles and Long Beach (tracks in the port areas and the Alameda Corridor)

The Southern California Regional Rail Authority JPA, aka Metrolink, was assembled rather quickly in a two-year period between 1990 and 1992. In the late 1980s, the Santa Fe and Southern Pacific railroads started selling off lightly-used mainline track segments. The counties banded together to jump on this opportunity to create a regional passenger rail network. Since a truly regional, inter-county passenger rail organization did not yet exist, Caltrans led negotiations for purchase of rights-of-way. The state paid for these Southern California track purchases made between 1990 and 1993, and were effectively 100% gifted to the counties without any rights remaining at Caltrans.

Eventually counties of the greater Los Angeles/Inland Empire region settled on creating a JPA in 1991 to get service started the following year, with annual financial operating contributions from each of the five member counties. In sum, the governance structure of Metrolink was assembled rather hastily given the immediate circumstances and opportunities of the time. All passenger rail lines in the region, except for the Metrolink Antelope Valley Line, are split between multiple owners. This inherently creates a challenge for line-wide capital and service improvements. Any of the five county transportation agencies, or even one board member (a county or city level elected politician), can veto a Metrolink project or service.

Over three decades after its formation, it is evident that the local/regional governance structure of Metrolink has resulted in:

• Lack of regional vision and failure to grasp the market potential (ridership and revenue) of fast frequent service that is common in the rest of the world.
• Lack of priority – county agencies favoring local high-profile transit projects (entirely within one county) vs. projects serving regional travelers going between counties.
• County and city elected officials serving on county transportation boards are overweighting neighborhood concerns for projects while failing to consider important regional and statewide goals. In addition, “supervisor courtesy”, unanimous concurrence among Board members, leads to gridlock with nothing moving forward).

Relatively straightforward siding and double-track projects, vital for increasing reliability and frequency of the entire regional rail system, have been halted by a handful of politically well-connected neighborhood members. A notable recent example is the stymying of the Serra Siding Extension project in south Orange County- a one-mile extension of an existing siding entirely in existing rail right-of-way. The siding is located at about the midway point between LA and San Diego, so is vital for increasing the number of passenger trains (by allowing ‘passing meets’). A handful of OCTA board members (listening to Capistrano Beach residents) are effectively deciding transportation policy for the entire Southern California region of 22 million people and whether the region’s residents should have additional regional passenger service. Ortega Siding near Santa Barbara is facing similar challenges of wealthy residents who live next to the tracks and the beach. 

Back in 2015, a single Los Angeles County Supervisor caved in to nearby residents who raised completely spurious concerns about double tracking on a 120’-wide right of way between Van Nuys and Chatsworth (the Raymer-Bernson segment which historically had double track), and even tried to divert the funds to another transit project. None of the other LA Metro board members opposed her. The project was already funded and permitted, and about to begin construction, but was cancelled at the last minute. Construction grant money was sent back to the state after millions had been spent on design and permitting. Passenger rail in Southern California has been impeded ever since, and a decade later, the need for the Raymer-Bernson double tracking project is greater than ever. Megaprojects like the Del Mar tunnel and Link Union Station are also taking way too long. For passenger rail to succeed in California and grow large enough to take a serious chunk of the transportation market away from cars and planes, there needs to be fewer veto actors with hyperlocal concerns.

The Caltrans Division of Rail ‘spun off’ the state-supported Amtrak services (Pacific Surfliner, Capitol Corridor, and San Joaquins/Gold Runner) into new county-level JPAs starting in the early 2000s. The operational funding still comes from the state, yet the JPAs create more overhead costs while at the same time even developing a self-destructive culture of cost-cutting (resulting in such indignity as food being eliminated from the six-hour runs of the Gold Runner).

The way forward: a new statewide unifying public agency for all rail transportation

Functioning as part of the California State Transportation Agency (CalSTA) a new statewide mega-agency, the California Rail Authority (CRA), would be created. Its key foundational components would be the Caltrans Division of Rail and Mass Transportation, California High Speed Rail Authority and all intercity passenger rail JPAs.  Some enabling legislation may be required, or even a statewide ballot measure. Politically it could be very difficult for county and local governments to give up the power of the county and regional-level rail transportation agencies. However, the purpose of this thought experiment/general concept of a CRA is not to work out every problem and solution in detail, but to look at the big picture.

The CRA would take over ownership of tracks currently owned by counties and JPAs, and purchase select Class I-owned track with minimal freight traffic (such as the UP-owned Coast Route). This would be like how rights-of-way for freeways and other major highways in California are owned and managed by the state through Caltrans. The new CRA would be responsible for developing and implementing the California State Rail Plan (and capital projects therein) and would take charge of all ongoing FRA-approved Corridor ID studies and Service Development Plans in development. A CRA would also work with Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) on incorporating passenger rail in regional transportation plans. In negotiations and working relationships with Class I railroads (UP and BNSF), a state-level agency with deep railroad expertise is needed. Negotiation power and clout would be much stronger with the state government than with individual counties.

 Operating with track usage agreements, locally funded regional rail services such as Metrolink, Caltrain, Coaster and ACE could even keep their branding identity (names, logos, etc., which would save costs and customer confusion) and regional-based management, with CRA serving to integrate operations. Similar to the fact that the lettered lines in the New York City Subway’s nomenclature date back to lines built by the Independent Subway System and the Brooklyn–Manhattan Transit Corporation, while the numbered lines were built and operated by the Interborough Rapid Transit Company. The line names (numbers/letters) are still used to this day, even though they all were consolidated into one publicly owned system back in 1940. The CRA would support and better coordinate regional services like Metrolink and COASTER with Amtrak service (both state-supported corridors and long distance). Amtrak could still be the operator of choice for intercity and regional rail.

All of the existing state-owned rolling stock fleet, and newly acquired intercity and regional rail equipment would be merged into one statewide, state-owned equipment pool with shared maintenance facilities and contract staff.

A CRA should be governed by full-time board with members,  appointed by the governor and legislature with a bias toward those possessing railroad and transportation expertise. At present, most of California transportation agencies’ boards consist of elected officials (at the county and city levels) who have no experience running a railroad and often have little interest in public transportation. Even with the best of intentions, the part-time board members have many other priorities and responsibilities in local government besides the transportation agency. Thus, boards have had neither the expertise nor the time to provide sufficient oversight of passenger rail operations and planning.

You might ask, doesn’t a CRA mega-agency create just one more big bureaucracy? Some amount of bureaucracy will always exist at all levels of publicly funded rail operations. The question is how efficient that bureaucracy is. Economies of scale can help make a bureaucracy vastly more efficient. Much of this potential comes from the reduction of overhead/streamlining of ‘back office’ functions. The current system involves a lot of legal contracts and financial transactions between multiple public agencies and Class I railroads.  This creates a lot of need for legal and accounting staff time. The resources needed to support much of these inter-organizational relationships and agreements would be better spent running trains.

In-house engineering and construction capacity for project delivery

A CRA would need a deep bench of in-house railroad operations, management, engineering and construction expertise. Reducing excessive reliance on outside consultants and contractors is key to reducing capital project costs, and getting more passenger rail service per public dollar spent. Ample experience from around the world has proven that in-house expertise brings infrastructure costs down with fewer cost overruns and delays. 

Like most state DOTs, Caltrans already has enormous in-house planning, engineering and construction management expertise for road projects statewide. The CRA would possess similar in-house capacity for the rail mode. Good salaries, competitive with those offered by private consulting firms, are needed to attract the best talent. Class I experience, preferably recently retired executives, would be sought out by the CRA.

A large, statewide rail organization is best suited to develop sufficient in-house expertise.  As described by UK railroad engineer Gareth Dennis in the 2024 book, How Railways Will Fix the Future, (pgs. 118 – 119):

“The retention of (or at least access to) the right skilled people to plan, maintain, develop and enhance a railway system can be challenging at a city or even regional level. This is a good example of where a strong and well-funded national railway organisation adds value, as it can act as a conduit for training, in collaboration with professional bodies and institutions, as well as driving forward useful bodies and institutions, as well as driving forward useful national-level programmes that can enhance devolved railroad operations. A large body like Deutsche Bahn or British Rail can train and retain expertise at a scale that would not be either viable or efficient at city level.

Another critical element for railway operations is to avoid the duplication of necessarily laborious processes, such as the development, certification and introduction of new trains. While customisation is valuable at a devolved level, the technical specifications must be standardised as much as possible, at as high a level as possible, to ensure that connected railway networks can accommodate each other’s trains on each other’s tracks. Even where there aren’t physical connections, there are benefits for efficient delivery of trains and infrastructure when there isn’t too much duplication of design processes, components, assemblies, certifications and so on.”

Training and workforce development would be a vital role for CRA. The CRA could host a ‘California rail academy’, apprenticeships, and support higher education courses in railroad management, operations, and engineering at California universities.

Tunnelling

A CRA rail tunnelling division would be the state’s center of tunneling expertise, and would contract for  and  manage the state’s tunnel projects, boring machines and other specialized tunnelling equipment. Major tunnel projects needed in California, which could be overseen by a CRA tunnelling division:

• San Francisco DTX tunnel
• Del Mar Coast Bypass Tunnel
• Miramar tunnels, San Diego
• LA Metro Sepulveda Pass Tunnel
• CHSR San Gabriel Mountain Tunnel
• San Clemente Coastal Bypass Tunnel(s)

Electrification

In addition to the advantages of faster service, higher reliability, and zero-emissions operation, electrification would reduce operations and maintenance costs. This in turns enables more frequency on existing track infrastructure. The success of Caltrain electrification needs to be replicated across the state.

California’s existing fragmented patchwork of local agencies makes regional rail electrification, which crosses county lines, much more difficult. County-level agencies typically don’t have sufficient resources to plan and build rail electrification projects. A dedicated CRA electrification division would handle all mainline rail electrification projects statewide, including the blended corridors like San Jose-Gilroy and Burbank-LA-Fullerton. The CRA could build, operate and maintain rail electrification infrastructure not only on state-owned track, but also track owned by Class I railroads (like the BNSF-owned segment between LA and Fullerton slated for electrification for CHSR).

California needs to electrify rail the way it has been successfully done around the world for over a century- with economies of scale, mass production and standardization.  Why India has been so successful lately with mass economical rail electrification (of over 99% of the nation’s mainline rail network) largely has to do with economies of scale: standardization and mass production by manufacturers and good contractor practices. Expertise and oversight are concentrated in the Central Organisation for Railway Electrification, the primary agency of the Indian Railways responsible for electrifying the nation’s rail network, which operates regional project units across India.

Freight

Class I infrastructure improvements have public benefit on corridors shared with passenger trains by creating more capacity and reliability for both – enabling more separation between them.

Freight trains have their own public benefits to economy and environment by getting trucks off the roads. A CRA freight division could provide a focal point and lead agency for freight oriented mega-projects and also facilitate  state-sponsored, truck-competitive intrastate medium-haul and short-haul freight rail service, not currently offered by the Class I railroads (BNSF and UP), or the Class III ‘shortline’ freight railroads operating in the state. The CRA freight division would not compete with these existing private freight railroads but instead partner with them to offer complementary new types of freight services, which are not in competition with existing freight operations. The state should also prioritize and aid industrial development along freight rail lines.

Statewide Amtrak Thruway Bus Network

Properly planned intercity and local bus transportation compliments and enhances rail transportation, by connecting passengers from longer train journeys to more local bus service. Amtrak Thruway bus operations, currently funded by the state but managed by three separate JPAs, need to be better consolidated and coordinated statewide, and CRA could take up this function. Bus-only tickets need to be allowed throughout the system.  This maximizes the public benefit of this transportation option offered and will lead to higher rail and transit ridership overall in the long run.

Funding

The deficiencies of California regional rail and transit funding are evident in 2026, with the notable ‘fiscal cliff’ examples being BART and Caltrain along with county-level agencies (particularly OCTA) trying to decrease their financial support of Metrolink.  There should be a move away from competitive grant programs like California’s Transit and Intercity Rail Capital Program, where worthy rail and transit projects have to compete against one another. Sequential funding of rail and transit projects, according to a well-thought long-term plan or program, would be more effective for building out the passenger rail network. Steady, predictable and dedicated funding sources at the state level need to be created for both passenger rail operations and capital projects. The CRA should have the power to issue bonds.

Other potential new sources for rail funding:

• Cap & Invest/ GHG emissions pricing programs
• Increases in gasoline and diesel taxes
• Tire tax
• Express lane or congestion fees on over capacity interstate highway segments
• Commercial/property development partnerships

An earlier version of this article appeared in the Summer 2026 issue of the Rail Users Network
Newsletter: https://www.railusers.net/newsletters/ .