After a few months of hiatus I’m back to clicking the keyboard and contributing once again to Steel Wheels. While I am sad that we can no longer afford a print version, (if the Atlanta Journal Constitution cannot run a print edition after 150 years, who can?) the online version, coupled with regular posts of news and opinions, enables us to be much more topical. And don’t forget that RailPAC still needs funds to operate and still needs members to maintain our credibility with elected officials.
Uncomfortable Parallels
Over the years regular readers of this column will have noted my very high regard for “Modern Railways”, the UK monthly magazine that I devour from end to end, all 100 pages of it. One columnist, Ian Walmsley, is a retired mechanical engineer and his to-the-point commentaries should be compulsory reading for rail managers everywhere. From the August 2025 edition I quote because the parallels with the US are extraordinary, and sadly, not in a good way: “In this 200th year of rail it is good to celebrate the achievements of the past, partly because achievements of the present are few and far between. What’s left of HS2 is delayed again, and yet more expensive. New trains are 5 years late and counting…..Train service delays stretching into many hours are no longer surprising.” Walmsley goes on to comment on the “advertorial trade press” and LinkedIn, where everyone gets a “well done” for things like remaining on a job or just doing what they are paid for.”
It’s not hard to see the similarities between CAHSR and HS2, and the comment on new trains vis a vis Superliner replacements and new trains for the California corridors. We are suffering from terrible deficit of execution. There is no shortage of plans. RailPAC Board member Robert Frampton is constantly updating a long spreadsheet of infrastructure projects around southern California, but how many are completed, and how long did they take? Leesdale siding, a straightforward three miles of straight track on level ground across the Oxnard plain, is still in planning. The process began in 2022 with completion now expected in 2027. At least 5 years for 3 miles of second main line. Sadly, I get no sense of urgency when I attend meetings of the various Boards responsible for these projects. “That’s just the way it is” is the prevailing attitude.
Motive Power Matters
When the purchase by Metrolink of the EMD F125 locomotives was announced back in 2016, many of us in the industry expressed concern that the design relied on power drawn from the main engine (prime mover) to provide heat and air conditioning to the train. The locomotives to be replaced all had an auxiliary diesel engine (HEP engine) and therefore independent of the prime mover to perform this function. However, the need to meet the emission target known as Tier 4 drove the decision to eliminate the HEP engine and therefore remove its emissions from the equation. Mission accomplished. The new locomotives could now meet Tier 4, aided not only by the elimination of the HEP emissions but also by removing weight of the second engine. Siemens, the competitor to the EMD F125 with their “Charger” locomotive, followed the same logic and likewise eliminated the HEP engine. But the question arises, what happens when the prime mover fails and the train is stranded?
As the recent incident on the Chicago – Detroit service attests, what happens is that the passengers on the train experience, at minimum, extreme discomfort as, in this case, the interior becomes uncomfortably hot. This discomfort can soon become dangerous to less healthy people, made worse by frustration and ultimately panic. The trains powered by these new locomotives are equally vulnerable in conditions of extreme cold. Those agencies that were responsible for setting the emissions targets were either willing to take on the added risk to the passengers, or more likely were ignorant of the consequences of an in-service main engine failure. Perhaps they were given reassurances by the manufacturers that their engines were so reliable that the risk was minimal.
Once I again I lay the problem at the feet of the Boards of Amtrak, SCRRA/Metrolink and others for passively accepting the specification of these new locomotives without questioning the risk factor to the passenger. And again I am convinced that the fault lies in the selection of Board members for political reasons, rather than for their industry knowledge. I don’t expect them to have the answers. They simply don’t know the questions to ask.
